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Abstract 
Can prior expectancies shape attention to threat? To answer this question, we manipulated the 
expectancies of spider phobics and nonfearful controls regarding the appearance of spider and bird 
targets in a visual search task. We observed robust evidence for expectancy influences on attention 
to birds, reflected in error rates, reaction times, pupil diameter, and heart rate (HR). We found no 
solid effect, however, of the same expectancies on attention to spiders; only HR revealed a weak 
and transient impact of prior expectancies on the orientation of attention to threat. Moreover, these 
asymmetric effects for spiders versus birds were observed in both phobics and controls. Our results 
are thus consistent with the notion of a threat detection mechanism that is only partially permeable 
to current expectancies, thereby increasing chances of survival in situations that are mistakenly 
perceived as safe.  
Keywords: encounter expectancy bias; attention bias; combined cognitive biases hypothesis; fear 
module; biological preparedness; spider phobia; pupil diameter; heart rate; respiration rate; visual 
search 
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Expectancy Influences on Attention to Threat Are Only Weak and Transient: Behavioral and 
Physiological Evidence 
Cognitive biases have been observed in both clinical and subclinical fear (Aue & Okon-Singer, 
2015; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997), while their 
existence in healthy individuals is more heavily debated (e.g., Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendorn, 2007). Several of these biases, including those in 
attention and expectancies, have been suggested to provoke and maintain anxiety disorders (Butler 
& Mathews, 1983; Taylor & Rachman, 1994). Systematic investigations of the biases and their 
interactions may yield a better understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying 
different types of fear, which is an important precondition for the development of adequate 
treatments. Following our earlier research on the topic (e.g., Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-
Singer, 2013), here we further investigate the question of whether—and to what extent—biased 
expectancies might cause biases in attention to threat.  
Cisler and Koster (2010) classify threat-related biases in attention as (a) early automatic 
vigilance for threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), termed facilitated attention (hereafter referred to as 
vigilance); (b) difficulty in disengaging attention from threat once it has been oriented to (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001); and (c) 
attentional avoidance of threat (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Mogg, Bradley, DeBono, & Painter, 
1997). The authors relate these different types of attention bias to different information processing 
stages. Specifically, vigilance to threat is seen as a result of automatic processing particularities 
arising from the initiation of an innate threat detection mechanism centered around the amygdala. 
Difficulty in disengagement of attention from threat, in contrast, is considered to be related to a 
mixture of strategic and automatic processing deficits that reflect defective attentional control 
mediated by the prefrontal cortex. Attentional avoidance of threat, finally, is thought to result from 
strategic processing peculiarities associated with the regulation of negative emotion that is also 
mediated by the prefrontal cortex.  
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Such a distinction of attention bias components can possibly explain some seemingly 
discrepant findings in the literature (e.g., phobia being characterized by vigilance to threat vs. 
avoidance of threat). For instance, in phobia, problems arising during early automatic processing of 
a threatening situation may temporarily lead to hypervigilance, whereas deficits during later 
strategic processing may be reflected in visual avoidance, corresponding to the so-called vigilance-
avoidance pattern (cf. Amir et al., 1998, and Mogg et al., 1997, for supportive evidence). Yet, there 
are also counterexamples to the vigilance-avoidance pattern idea in pathological fear. For instance, 
some authors find no evidence for vigilance to threat during automatic information processing and 
report only attentional avoidance during strategic information processing (e.g., Aue, Hoeppli, 
Piguet, Sterpenich, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999). These 
inconsistencies remain to be resolved by future research.  
Much can be learned from the identification of the concrete factors that cause vigilance and 
avoidance. One of these influential factors might relate to prior expectancies that, at times, are 
themselves biased. Indeed, expectancy biases are common in exaggerated fear and phobia (Aue & 
Hoeppli, 2012; Foa & Kozak, 1986). For example, spider phobics have been reported to 
overassociate spiders with negative outcomes (consequences expectancy bias; e.g., Mühlberger, 
Wiedemann, Herrmann, & Pauli, 2006; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, den Breejen, & Makkelie, 2007). 
Furthermore, spider phobics, but not nonfearful controls, overestimate the likelihood of 
encountering spiders (encounter expectancy bias; e.g., Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; Aue et al., 2015; de 
Jong & Muris, 2002). Comparable biases have been reported for other anxiety disorders (Amrhein, 
Pauli, Dengler, & Wiedemann, 2005; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; McManus, Clark, & 
Hackmann, 2000). 
Given the prevalent nature of both attention and expectancy biases in anxiety disorders, it is 
imaginable that one type of bias originates in the other. For instance, because highly fearful and 
phobic individuals overestimate the likelihood of being confronted with situations they fear (i.e., 
encounter expectancy bias), they may subsequently modify their deployment of attention. In some 
cases, such as a likely attack by a predator, it may be adaptive to be particularly vigilant; increased 
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vigilance may ultimately result in facilitated detection of the threat source. Combined with an 
expectancy-triggered preparation of adequate behavioral responses that enable quick distancing 
from the anticipated source of threat, facilitated detection may thus save time that is essential to 
survival. However, if flight is determined to be nonessential for survival, highly fearful and phobic 
individuals may ultimately engage in visual avoidance of the threat source in order to successfully 
regulate their fear. Whether sustained vigilance or avoidance arises from enhanced encounter 
expectancies may thus depend on the moment in time and/or the type of anticipated consequences 
(i.e., consequences expectancy bias).  
One may also hypothesize about the existence of the reverse link, namely, that attention 
deployment has a causal impact on expectancies. Focusing on negative aspects in a situation may 
increase the subjective likelihood of similarly negative things happening in the future, simply 
because people base their appreciation of the future on available information. These reflections 
suggest that expectancies and attentional processes may be intimately linked in pathological fear, 
with one bias causing the other. In fact, the “combined cognitive biases hypothesis” (Hirsch et al., 
2006; see also Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Ingram, 1984; J. M. G. Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) states that cognitive biases in psychopathology rarely operate 
independently but, rather, most often mutually influence each other. Along these lines, Peschard 
and Philippot (2015) suggested attentional and memory processes in anxiety to be closely 
connected. According to these authors, it is the focus of attention that determines awareness of 
working memory content, and the focus of attention should itself be influenced by factors such as 
task goals, stimulus salience, and long-term memory. 
Theoretical considerations raised by researchers in the tradition of the combined cognitive 
biases hypothesis (e.g., Everaert et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2006) comprise memory, interpretation, 
and attention biases, as well as self-imagery bias. We (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015) recently 
proposed that this theoretical perspective can be easily broadened to include expectancy biases. The 
identification of mutual influences between different types of cognitive bias (e.g., attention bias, 
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expectancy bias, interpretation bias, memory bias) is thought to have an important impact on the 
understanding of the basic mechanisms underlying anxiety disorders and might inspire the 
development of new, more efficient, therapeutic approaches that straightforwardly address the 
causal factors. Yet, to date, studies examining (causal) relations between attention and expectancy 
biases are surprisingly sparse. 
In two experiments, we investigated the nature of the relationship between attention and 
expectancies. An eye-tracking experiment (Aue, Hoeppli, et al., 2013) revealed that self-determined 
visual avoidance of depicted spiders in spider phobics during strategic information processing was 
associated with a reduced subsequently indicated encounter expectancy bias in these individuals 
(i.e., the less attention that was paid to a picture of a spider, the lower the subjective likelihood of 
encountering the animal displayed). Hence, visual avoidance in phobic fear may be hypothesized to 
downregulate encounter expectancies and thereby to possibly downregulate experienced fear. 
Interestingly, the opposite relationship was observed for the control group, which was characterized 
by low spider fear: These participants showed a positive correlation between the extent of visual 
avoidance of the spiders and their encounter expectancies for spiders. Therefore, healthy 
participants may be better at regulating their expectancies (and fear) if they are particularly attentive 
to potentially menacing situations. Yet, because our experimental paradigm did not allow the 
investigation of causality, these interpretations of the data are to be treated with reservation. 
In a second study, we (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013) directly examined causality in the 
expectancy-attention relationship. To measure vigilance to threat in spider phobic and nonfearful 
controls, we used a visual search task (Flykt, Lindeberg, & Derakshan, 2012; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, & Öhman, 2009). Participants saw a 3 (rows) × 3 
(columns) search array, their task being to rapidly detect a spider or a bird target displayed among 
eight butterflies (distractors). Vigilance to threat was assessed by comparing the participants’ 
reaction times (RTs) for the detection of spider versus bird targets.  
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To test whether prior expectancies exert a causal influence on vigilance to threat, we 
manipulated encounter expectancies; verbal cues preinformed the participants about the likelihood 
that the target in the subsequently displayed visual search array would be a spider or a bird. Because 
expectancies were hypothesized to effectuate a top-down influence on early attention deployment in 
the visual search task, we had predicted an effect of congruency, with detection of spider targets 
being facilitated by spider cues and detection of bird targets being facilitated by bird cues.1 
Surprisingly, though, the RTs of neither the spider phobic nor the control participants 
revealed an influence of the expectancy cues on the detection of spider targets. Notably, the same 
expectancy cues clearly had the predicted impact on RTs for bird targets, thus providing evidence 
that our expectancy manipulation had been successful. Together, therefore, these RT data did not 
yield support to our idea that expectancy bias is at the origin of attention bias for threat. Instead, we 
discussed the possibility that evolution has formed attentional systems that are specific to the 
detection of phylogenetic threat (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971) and that are only 
weakly or not at all susceptible to expectancies. In fact, the existence of a fear module (Davis & 
Lang, 2003; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) that ensures automatic processing 
of threatening stimuli (cf. Cisler & Koster, 2010) independently of explicit expectancies may be 
advantageous for survival; after all, false expectancies of safety may have fatal consequences. 
Yet, these data do not necessarily imply that expectancies have been altogether irrelevant for 
the detection of spider targets. The influence of expectancies on attention deployment could be 
subject to temporal unfolding and thus different at different moments in time. One possible scenario 
is that humans do detect expected spiders earlier than unexpected spiders. Because unexpected 
detection of spider targets may signal greater urgency than expected detection of those targets, 
attention allocation after detection may, however, be temporarily intensified for the unexpected 
spider targets (reorienting of attention), and subsequent translation into overt behavior (i.e., target 
indication in the visual search task) may be speeded up. Thus, the lack of influence of expectancies 
on attention as revealed in the RTs of our earlier study could be due to unexpected spider targets 
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calling for particularly fast behavioral responding. Speeded responding would enable an individual 
to make up for the initial delay that arose from false expectancy.  
But even in the case that expectancies do not influence the detection of spiders, 
(dis)confirmation of expectancies might still play a role in attention allocation and response 
preparation later on. For instance, registration of deviation with expectations could lead the 
organism to quickly respond with corrective physiological changes (e.g., related to the reorienting 
of attention) in order to adequately process and adaptively confront the situation.2 Together, these 
reflections show that temporal processing differences between expected and unexpected spider 
targets might cancel each other out in RTs. Unlike time-sensitive physiological measures such as 
pupil diameter and heart rate (HR), RTs would not adequately map such temporal unfolding in 
attention allocation, especially if the corresponding changes were only weak. Thus, there might be 
measures that are more sensitive than RTs that still reveal an influence of expectancy on attention to 
threat. 
 To investigate this question further, we conducted a new study based on the same 
experimental paradigm. In addition to RTs and error rates in the visual search task, we measured 
our participants’ pupil diameter, HR, and respiration rate (RR). We examined how attention bias 
and, most important, the influence of prior expectancies on attention to threatening versus 
nonthreatening targets, are reflected in behavior and physiology.  
First, we expected an attention bias for spider targets, especially in phobics (cf. Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 2013). Greater vigilance for spider rather 
than bird targets was predicted to be reflected in fewer errors and shorter RTs. Moreover, in the 
literature, orienting of attention has been related to increased pupil diameter (Lynn, 1966; Sokolov, 
1963; Wang & Munoz, 2015, but see Steiner & Barry, 2011) and decreased early HR (Bradley & 
Lang, 2007; Stekelenburg & Van Boxtel, 2002) and suggested to increase sensory sensitivity. 
Accordingly, we predicted a greater pupil diameter and more pronounced initial HR deceleration for 
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spider than for bird targets. Usually, HR in response to the presentation of visual scenes is 
characterized by a triphasic pattern (initial deceleration followed by acceleration followed by 
second deceleration; e.g., Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). In addition to the initial decrease in 
HR, we anticipated a greater subsequent HR acceleration (corresponding to greater mobilization 
after target detection; Aue, Hoeppli, & Piguet, 2012; Flykt, 2005; Flykt et al., 2012) for spider than 
for bird targets.  
Second, from the results of our earlier study, we predicted the effect of cue-target 
congruency for bird targets to be visible in our participants’ behavior (response errors and RTs). 
Specifically, identification of bird targets was hypothesized to be facilitated by bird cues and 
slowed down by spider cues. By contrast, cue-target congruency was expected to be absent 
regarding behavioral indicators (i.e., response errors and RTs) of the identification of spider targets. 
Moreover, we hypothesized that, in contrast to the behavioral responses, our participants’ 
physiology regarding spider targets would be influenced by the earlier presented cues. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that, because of reorienting of attention, the processing of unexpected targets 
(comprising both spiders and birds) would rely on greater attentional resources, expressed in 
increased pupil diameter and stronger initial HR deceleration (see Supplementary Materials for 
additional hypotheses regarding RR).  
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-five participants (21 spider phobic; 10 male [4 in the spider phobic and 6 in the control 
group]), aged between 18 and 34 years (M = 23.5, SD = 4.10) were recruited via ads placed in 
university buildings, as well as on university and local websites. The study was embedded in a 
larger project investigating decision making and psychophysiological responses during the 
imagination of encounters with feared and nonfeared animals. The ads explicitly specified these 
project aims. Persons interested in the study were interviewed by telephone and checked for criteria 
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of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems (10th rev.; ICD-10; World Health Organization; 1992) for the presence or 
absence of spider phobia (adapted from Mühlberger et al., 2006). Participants were included in the 
study if they (a) met the DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria for spider phobia (spider phobic group), or (b) 
fulfilled none of the criteria and additionally claimed to not fear spiders (control group). Another 
condition for inclusion in the study was a body mass index between 18.5 and 25. Exclusion criteria 
comprised neurological, cardiovascular, respiratory, and psychiatric diseases other than spider 
phobia, as well as medication use, pregnancy, claustrophobia, and metal implants. Some of these 
criteria related to the fact that participants performed the experimental task in a magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) scanner (functional MRI data are not presented here and have not been published 
yet).  
Fear of spiders was further assessed after the experiment with the French translation of the 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995), t(43) = 14.40, p < .000001 (Ms = 
89.6 and 28.9, SDs = 15.05 and 13.20, for phobic and control groups, respectively). Participants in 
the two groups did not differ with respect to age, t(43) = -0.93, ns (Ms = 22.9 and 24.0 years, SDs = 
3.61 and 4.50 years, for phobic and control groups, respectively); trait anxiety, t(43) = 0.67, ns (Ms 
= 40.9 and 39.1, SDs = 8.31 and 8.93, for phobic and control groups, respectively); and state 
anxiety, t(42) = 1.25, ns (Ms = 35.3 and 31.9, SDs = 9.45 and 10.23, for phobic and control groups, 
respectively; one participant in the control group did not complete this scale), as measured with the 
French version (Gauthier & Bouchard, 1993) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (original English 
version: Spielberger, 1983). 
 
Stimuli and Experimental Paradigm 
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The experimental task was a visual search task and included the presentation of three types of 
expectancy cues that were thought to facilitate or inhibit the detection of spider and bird targets in a 
search array (see Procedure for further details). 
Cues (expectancy manipulation). Three types of verbal cues were presented as text on the 
computer screen. The first, “spider 90%,” specified a 90% probability that the to-be-detected 
(deviant) target in the subsequently presented search array would be a spider among eight 
butterflies. Because the target could have been either a spider or a bird, this cue expressed a high 
probability for a spider target and a low probability for a bird target. The second cue, “bird 90%,” 
specified a 90% probability that the to-be-detected target in the subsequently presented search array 
would be a bird. Thus, this cue expressed a high probability for a bird target and a low probability 
for a spider target. Finally, the third cue, “spider bird 50%” (for half of the participants; for the 
other half, the third cue was “bird spider 50%”), specified an equal probability for a spider or a bird 
to be the target in the search array and constituted a control condition with maximum uncertainty. In 
such cases, habitual individual response tendencies (related to habitual encounter expectancies) 
might be strongest. 
In reality, the spider 90% [bird 90%] cue (for simplicity, termed spider [bird] cue in the 
following) condition referred to a probability of 70% (68 trials) that there would actually be a spider 
[bird] target among eight butterflies in the search array presented thereafter. This discrepancy 
occurred because we had aimed at reducing the duration of the experiment while keeping the cues 
highly salient and ensuring enough trials in each experimental condition; refer to the Limitations 
section for details. In the remaining cases, either a bird [spider] target was presented (24 trials) or 
no deviant at all (4 trials). The latter trials were included to verify that the participants responded on 
the basis of target perception. 
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In the 50% (i.e., ambiguous) cue condition, in contrast, there was indeed an equal likelihood 
of either a spider or a bird being the target in the subsequently shown search array (48 trials; 24 
spider targets and 24 bird targets). In some cases, there was no deviant (4 trials).  
Visual search array (used to measure vigilance). Stimuli consisted of (a) 30 pictures 
displaying spiders, all taken from the Geneva Affective PicturE Database (GAPED; Dan Glauser & 
Scherer, 2011); (b) 30 birds, collected from the Internet; and (c) 100 butterflies, also collected from 
the Internet. The animals covered virtually the whole picture (see example of a search array in 
Figure 1). In each trial, the search array consisted of a matrix of nine different animal pictures with 
three columns and three rows. There was no space in-between the pictures, and each picture within 
the matrix was displayed at 341 × 256 pixels.  The butterfly distracters were selected on the basis of 
the assumption that they share significant features with both spiders and birds (e.g., wings 
corresponding to birds’ wings; six legs and two antennas corresponding to the eight legs of spiders). 
Seventy-five percent of the butterflies were displayed from their side, clearly showing all legs and 
antennas. All images were displayed in gray scale, preventing pop-out effects based on color 
differences between stimulus categories. The stimuli in the two categories were matched for 
luminance and contrast, and spider and bird targets appeared with an equal probability in any of the 
nine different locations within the matrix.  
 
Procedure 
Upon participants’ arrival at the laboratory, the nature of the experiment was explained and 
written informed consent was obtained (protocol approved by the local ethics committee and in 
accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights; World Medical Association, 1999). The 
experimental task was introduced as a test of the capacity to detect spiders and birds in an array of 
butterflies and performed in an MRI scanner (MRI data are not presented here). After participants 
had thoroughly read the instructions for the task, they performed 10 practice trials to become 
familiar with the task. If they had no questions, they were comfortably positioned in an MRI 
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scanner and the physiological sensors that enabled the acquisition of HR and RR were attached. 
Before starting with the experimental task, a standard calibration procedure for eye tracking (in 
order to permit acquisition of pupil diameter) was undertaken. During this procedure, participants 
looked at nine dots appearing at different locations on the computer screen. The experimental task 
was performed next. 
In each experimental trial, participants saw a fixation cross that was followed by a cue. The 
cue referred to the probability that the to-be-detected target in the subsequently presented search 
array would be a spider or a bird (see preceding section for details). After the presentation of the 
cue, another fixation cross appeared. Next, the search array consisting of nine pictures (either nine 
butterflies [no target], eight butterflies and a spider, or eight butterflies and a bird) was shown and 
the participants had to decide whether there was no target, or whether the target was a spider or a 
bird. 
Participants were instructed to react as fast and as correctly as possible. Responses were 
given by pressing three different buttons of a response button box (counterbalanced across 
participants). In total, 244 experimental trials were presented in random order in four runs of 61 
trials with short pauses in between. The average intertrial interval was 9.5 s (range: 9-10 s; for an 
example of an experimental trial [task sequence], see Figure 1). We decided on such a comparably 
long intertrial interval (i.e., long experimental trials) for two reasons: First, we attempted to ensure 
enough time to allow long latency signals (e.g., RR) to unfold in response to the different cues and 
targets and, second, we wanted to provide sufficient time for cue processing (on average 4 s), thus 
permitting our participants to prepare a search strategy. After the participants had completed the 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire and the trait and state scales of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
they were debriefed. 
 
Setting and Apparatus 
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HR was acquired continuously at a sampling rate of 10000 Hz with the Biopac MP150 System 
(Goleta, CA, USA). HR (in beats per minute, bpm) was assessed by the use of the TSD123 
oximeter transducer placed on the participant’s index finger. Peripheral signals were transferred 
from the experimental room to the MP150 Acquisition Unit (16-bit A/D conversion) in the control 
room and stored on computer hard disk. A digital channel received inputs from the presentation 
computer and recorded on- and offset of the presented stimuli. Parameterization was performed 
with AcqKnowledge 4.1 (Biopac, Goleta, CA, USA).  
Visual stimuli were presented on a back projection screen inside the scanner bore using an 
LCD projector (CP-SX1350, Hitachi, Tokyo, Japan). Participants’ pupil diameters were monitored 
continuously at a sampling rate of 60 Hz with the EyeTrac6 Eye Tracking System (Applied 
Sciences Laboratories, Bedford, MA, USA). The eye camera is characterized by easily accessible 
focus and iris adjustments. The illuminator source is an FCR lamp (12 VDC power supply; non-
coherent illumination). Eye irradiance was less than 0.5 mW/cm3. Behavioral responses were 
recorded with a response button box (HH-1×4-CR, Current Designs, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, USA), 
and experimental control was performed by E-Prime 2 Professional (Psychology Software Tools, 
Sharpsburg, PA, USA). 
 
Dependent Variables 
Behavioral data. The dependent behavioral variables consisted of (a) the participants’ errors 
(in %) and (b) their RTs for correct responses (in ms) in the different experimental conditions of the 
visual search task.  
Physiological data. The dependent physiological variables consisted of the participants’ 
pupil diameter (in arbitrary units) and HR (in beats per minute; bpm), as well as their RR (in cycles 
per minute; see Supplementary Materials). For pupil diameter, a short latency signal that adapts 
quickly, we considered six 0.5-s intervals from 0 to 3 s after the search array onset. The last time 
interval extended the display of the search matrix by 0.5 s because we expected the differences 
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between the experimental conditions to be somewhat sustained. Pupil diameter during 0.5 s before 
the appearance of the search matrix (final part of expectancy phase) served as baseline. Pupil 
diameter baseline scores were subtracted from the scores during and after stimulus presentation to 
obtain difference scores describing changes resulting from the presentation of the different stimuli. 
HR was analyzed in 1-s intervals from 0 to 5 s after the search array onset, thus extending 
2.5 s beyond the actual search matrix display. Compared with the interval used for pupil size, a 
longer extending interval was taken because this time was considered necessary to map at least the 
first two phases of the typically observed triphasic pattern (initial deceleration [reflecting an 
orienting response, thus constituting the most critical interval for our testing of hypotheses 
regarding cue-target congruency], followed by acceleration and, subsequently, by another 
deceleration; e.g., Lang et al., 1997) in response to pictures. HR during 1 s before the appearance of 
the search matrix (final part of expectancy phase) served as baseline. HR baseline scores were 
subtracted from the scores during and after stimulus presentation to obtain difference scores 
describing changes resulting from the presentation of the different stimuli. 
 
Results 
Behavioral Data 
Error rates. Errors made up 9.7% of all responses (SD = 9.08%; for an overview of the 
number and percentage of correct and incorrect responses per group and condition, see Table 1). 
Because the normal distribution assumption was violated, we calculated nonparametric statistics to 
test for differences in error rates between the experimental conditions.  
Attention bias. We had predicted an attention bias for spiders, with spider targets being 
characterized by fewer errors than bird targets. To test this hypothesis, we calculated Wilcoxon tests 
for differences in error rates between the two targets (bird-spider). In accordance with predictions, 
both the test for phobic participants, Z(19) = 2.74, p < .01 (Ms = 9.1% and 5.0% errors, for bird and 
spider targets, respectively; number of positive ranks = 15, number of negative ranks = 4, number of 
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same ranks = 2) and that for controls, Z(19) = 2.52, p < .01 (Ms = 12.0% and 8.2% errors, for bird 
and spider targets, respectively; number of positive ranks = 14, number of negative ranks = 7, 
number of same ranks = 3) reached significance. Hence, as hypothesized, both groups displayed 
greater error rates for bird than for spider targets.    
Cue-target congruency. We had predicted an influence of expectancies on the error rates for 
bird targets but not on the error rates for spider targets. Therefore, we first calculated four Friedman 
tests (see Table 1 for descriptives and rank statistics) to investigate differences between the 
expectancy cues for each combination of the factors Group and Target (note that, because the data 
violated the normal distribution, we were unable to calculate an analysis of variance [ANOVA] that 
would have enabled simultaneous testing of effects related to the four Friedman tests). In line with 
our expectations, we found an influence of the expectancy cues on error rates for bird targets in the 
phobic group, χ2(2) = 15.27, p < .0005; however, the same test failed to reach significance in the 
control group, χ2(2) = 2.76, ns. Subsequent Wilcoxon tests calculated for bird targets in the spider 
phobic group revealed a greater number of errors for spider cues than for the other cues, Z(21) = 
3.25 and Z(16) = 2.97, both ps < .005, for bird and ambiguous cues, respectively. There was no 
difference between bird cues and ambiguous cues, Z(21) = 1.36, ns. Finally, in line with our 
predictions, both Friedman tests performed for spider targets failed to reach significance, χ2s(2) = 
4.19 and 3.71, both ns, for phobics and controls, respectively. 
Reaction times. A 2 × 3 × 2 mixed-factorial design resulted from the manipulation of the 
between-participants factor Group (spider phobic, control) and the within-participants factors 
Expectancy (spider, bird, ambiguous) and Target (spider, bird). The ANOVA simultaneously tested 
(a) our hypothesis of an attention bias (shorter RTs for spider than for bird targets, i.e., main effect 
of Target, especially in the phobics, i.e., Group × Target interaction); and (b) our hypothesis that 
expectancy cues would have an impact on RTs for bird targets but not on RTs for spider targets 
(Expectancy × Target interaction). Significant effects as revealed in this ANOVA were further 
investigated by subordinate ANOVAs and the use of post hoc Tukey tests. An α level of .05 (two-
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tailed) was applied. All reported effect sizes are partial η2 and are simply noted as η2p. Analyses 
were performed on correct responses only. After elimination of the error trials, 0.3% (SD = 0.4%) 
of the data were outliers (RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from a participant’s average RT on correct 
responses) and thus additionally excluded.  
 Attention bias. Consistent with our predictions, our participants displayed an attention 
bias for spiders (Figure 2, Table 2, main effect of Target), reflected in shorter RTs for spider than 
for bird targets (Ms = 998.4 and 1276.1 ms, SDErrors = 26.73 and 28.21 ms, for spider and bird 
targets, respectively). Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, the attention bias was not stronger in the phobic 
group than in the control group (absence of significant Group × Target interaction).  
Cue-target congruency. We had hypothesized that expectancy cues would have an impact 
on RTs for bird targets, but not on RTs for spider targets. In line with our hypotheses, the 
significant Expectancy × Target interaction revealed that expectancy effects were limited to bird 
targets: When a bird cue had been presented, RTs for bird targets were considerably shorter than 
when a spider or an ambiguous cue had been presented (ps < .0005; no difference between spider 
and ambiguous cues, p > .25; Ms = 1328.0, 1204.8, and 1295.5 ms, SDErrors = 27.54, 32.01, and 
30.33 ms, for spider, bird, and ambiguous cues, respectively). By contrast, post hoc Tukey tests for 
this interaction showed no difference between the three expectancy cues for spider targets (ps > .25; 
Ms = 1019.7, 985.7, and 989.8 ms, SDErrors = 29.00, 28.09, and 26.73 ms, for spider, bird, and 
ambiguous cues, respectively).  Because the same expectancy cues were used in spider and bird 
target trials, the missing effect for spider targets cannot be explained by an inefficient expectancy 
manipulation.  
Of importance however, the significant Group × Expectancy × Target interaction revealed 
that expectancy cues had a different impact on RTs for the two targets in phobics versus controls. 
Therefore, we further investigated the extent to which the above-reported interaction of Expectancy 
and Target held for both phobics and controls, and we conducted separate ANOVAs in each group. 
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Phobics displayed a significant main effect of Expectancy, F(2, 40) = 7.70, p < .005, η2p = .28 (Ms 
= 1171.5, 1113.0, and 1144.8 ms, SDErrors = 38.06, 39.45, and 35.69 ms, for spider, bird, and 
ambiguous cues, respectively), with post hoc Tukey tests revealing significantly longer RTs for 
spider cues than for bird cues (p < .005). The difference between bird cues and ambiguous cues was 
only marginally significant (p = .09), with that between spider and ambiguous cues failing to reach 
significance (p > .15). In addition, we found a significant main effect of Target, F(1, 20) = 67.50, p 
< .005, η2p = .77 (Ms = 1017.5 and 1268.7 ms, SDErrors = 42.46 and 36.98 ms, for spider and bird 
targets, respectively), corresponding to the attention bias for spiders. Unexpectedly though, there 
was no significant interaction of both factors, F(2, 40) = 1.06, ns, η2p = .05. Thus, irrespective of 
type of target, bird cues were followed by faster RTs than were spider cues in this group of 
participants. In a similar vein, the attention bias for spider targets was independent from the earlier 
presented cues. 
In controls, all effects achieved significance: the main effect of Expectancy, F(2, 46) = 
16.61, p < .000005, η2p = .42 (Ms = 1176.1, 1077.6, and 1140.6 ms, SDErrors = 33.78, 35.10, and 
33.88 ms, for spider, bird, and ambiguous cues, respectively); the main effect of Target, F(1, 23) = 
65.10, p < .000001, η2p = .74 (Ms = 979.3 and 1283.6 ms, SDErrors = 33.50 and 41.67 ms, for spider 
and bird targets, respectively); and the Expectancy × Target interaction, F(2, 46) = 12.75, p < 
.00005, η2p = .36. Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that RTs for spider targets were not influenced by 
the cues presented (ps > .70 for the three relevant comparisons; Ms = 999.32, 970.67, and 967.87 
ms, SDErrors = 38.89, 48.51, and 45.46 ms, for spider, bird, and ambiguous cues, respectively), 
whereas, regarding RTs for bird targets, bird cues could be distinguished from both spider and 
ambiguous cues (ps < .0005, with no difference between spider and ambiguous cues, p > .45; Ms = 
1353.0, 1184.4, and 1313.4 ms, SDErrors = 35.35, 35.16, and 45.46 ms, for spider, bird, and 
ambiguous cues, respectively). Thus, expectancy manipulations were ineffective in modifying RTs 
for spider targets in the control group. 
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Physiological Data 
As a result of technical problems, three participants (two phobic and one control) were excluded 
from pupil diameter analyses, and one phobic participant was excluded from HR analyses. For pupil 
diameter, 6% of the time intervals analyzed constituted periods with ≥50% of the samples missing 
(mostly due to eye blinks). Consequently, these time intervals were not included in the analyses. 
Outliers (deviating more than 3 SDs from the average diameter/HR of a given participant during a 
particular time interval) and artifacts were eliminated (making up 4% of all pupil diameter data and 
approximately 1% of all HR data).  
Pupil diameter. We conducted an ANOVA that relied on a 2 (Group: spider phobic, 
control) × 6 (Time: 0-0.5 s, 0.5-1 s, 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s, 2.5-3 s) × 3 (Expectancy: spider, bird, 
ambiguous) × 2 (Target: spider, bird) mixed-factorial design. The ANOVA simultaneously tested 
our hypotheses of (a) greater attention allocation to spider than to bird targets, especially in the 
phobics (main effect of Target; Group × Target interaction, including possible modulation by the 
factor Time); and (b) expectancy cues having an impact on pupil diameters for both bird and spider 
targets, with unexpected targets necessitating enhanced orienting, thus being associated with greater 
diameters than is the case for expected targets (Expectancy × Target interaction, including possible 
modulations by the factors Group and Time).  
Attention bias. The ANOVA revealed no simple effect of Target, but a significant Time × 
Target interaction (Table 2). Separate ANOVAs for each time interval yielded a main effect of 
Target from 2 to 2.5 s after the onset of the visual search matrix only (Table 3, Figure 3). In conflict 
with our hypotheses, the increase in pupil diameter with respect to baseline was stronger for bird 
than for spider targets during that time (Ms = 2.04 and 2.25, SDErrors = 0.19 and 0.22, for spider and 
bird targets, respectively). There was no indication of group differences regarding the attention 
allocation to spider versus bird targets (absence of a significant Group × Target interaction; Table 
2). 
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Cue-target congruency. The ANOVA further yielded a significant Expectancy × Target 
interaction (Table 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, we found an influence of expectancy cues on 
pupil diameter change related to bird targets (Tukey tests: bird vs. ambiguous cues, p < .001, other 
ps > .24, Ms = 1.33, 1.18, and 1.48, SDErrors = 0.15, 0.15, and 0.17, for spider, bird, and ambiguous 
cues, respectively). Although Tukey tests did not reveal a significant difference between spider and 
bird cues for bird targets, planned comparisons did so, F(1, 40) = 5.46, p < .05 (one-tailed). 
Inconsistent with predictions, however, similar effects were not observed for spider targets (Tukey 
tests: ps > .97 for all pairwise comparisons; Ms = 1.24, 1.30, and 1.27, SDErrors = 0.14, 0.14, and 
0.14, for spider, bird, and ambiguous cues, respectively). In that case, even planned comparisons of 
spider versus bird cues failed to reach significance, F(1, 40) = 0.99, ns.  
Of note, we also found a significant Time × Expectancy × Target interaction. Subsequent 
ANOVAs calculated for each time interval (Table 3) showed that the differential impact of 
expectancy cues on pupil diameter change related to bird targets started between 1 and 1.5 s 
following the onset of the search matrix and remained stable until the end of the analysis interval 
(ambiguous vs. bird cues: ps < .05, .01, .005, and .005, for 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s, and 2.5-3 s, 
respectively; other pairwise comparisons for bird targets: ps > .25; based on Tukey tests for the 
Expectancy × Target interaction), whereas there were no differences between the expectancy cues 
for spider targets (all ps > .69, .68, .74, and .96, for 1-1.5 s, 1.5-2 s, 2-2.5 s, and 2.5-3 s, 
respectively). 
Other effects. The main effect of Group in the overall ANOVA was related to the fact that 
control participants displayed greater increases in pupil diameter than did spider phobics (Ms = 0.97 
and 1.63, SDErrors = 0.21 and 0.19, for phobics and controls, respectively). The significant Time × 
Group interaction arose because this group difference was absent in the first time interval (0-0.5 s 
after search matrix appearance) and present in the remaining intervals (Table 3). The overall 
ANOVA further revealed a significant main effect of Expectancy (Table 2), with ambiguous cues, 
compared with bird cues, being associated with stronger increases in pupil diameter (Tukey tests; p 
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< .05; other pairwise comparisons: ps > .14; Ms = 1.32, 1.27, and 1.41, SDErrors = 0.14, 0.14, and 
0.15, for spider, bird, and ambiguous cues, respectively). 
Heart rate. For our HR data, we conducted a similar ANOVA as for pupil diameter. The 
ANOVA simultaneously tested our hypotheses of (a) greater orienting and arousal for spider than 
for bird targets, especially in the phobics (main effect of Target; Group × Target interaction, 
including possible modulation by the factor Time); and (b) expectancy cues having an impact on 
attention to both bird and spider targets, with unexpected targets necessitating enhanced orienting, 
thus being associated with greater initial deceleration than is the case for expected targets 
(Expectancy × Target interaction, including possible modulations by the factors Group and Time).  
Attention bias and arousal. We had predicted that attention bias (initial deceleration) and 
arousal differences (subsequent acceleration) would be displayed in HR, particularly so in the 
phobic group. The 2 (Group: spider phobic, control) × 5 (Time: 0-1 s, 1-2 s, 2-3 s, 3-4 s, 4-5 s) × 3 
(Expectancy: spider, bird, ambiguous) × 2 (Target: spider, bird) ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of Target (Ms = -0.20 and -0.48 bpm, SDErrors = 0.13 and 0.14 bpm, for spider and bird 
targets, respectively) and a significant Group × Target interaction (Table 2): Phobic individuals 
were characterized by a more elevated HR for spider than for bird targets (post hoc Tukey test, p < 
.01; Ms = 0.00 and -0.55 bpm, SDErrors = 0.19 and 0.21 bpm, for spider and bird targets, 
respectively); in contrast, controls showed comparable HRs for both bird and spider targets (p > 
.99); Ms = -0.41 and -0.41 bpm, SDErrors = 0.17 and 0.19 bpm, for spider and bird targets, 
respectively). 
In addition, the main effect of Target was qualified by the factor Time. In order to 
investigate this interaction (and other interactions as revealed in the section on Cue-Target 
Congruency) we further performed supplemental ANOVAs for each time interval. Target and 
Group × Target effects appeared comparably late, namely between 2 and 5 s after the onset of the 
visual search array, demonstrating a more rapid or pronounced change from initial HR deceleration 
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to HR acceleration for spider targets than for bird targets (for details, see above description of the 
Group × Target interaction). This suggests that arousal rather than orienting is responsible for the 
effect. Notably, however, the effect in the interval extending from 4 to 5 s was reversed for control 
participants; during that time, these participants displayed stronger HR acceleration for bird targets 
than for spider targets. Post hoc Tukey tests for the control participants’ HR change in this time 
interval failed, however, to reach significance, p > .12; Ms = 0.58 and 1.02 bpm, SDErrors = 0.28 and 
0.33 bpm, for spider and bird targets, respectively), and there was no difference between the targets 
in phobics at the same moment in time (p > .80, Ms = 1.04 and 0.84 bpm, SDErrors = 0.31 and 0.36 
bpm, for spider and bird targets, respectively). 
Cue-target congruency. We had further hypothesized that the influence of the expectancy 
cues on our participants’ HRs would be dependent on their congruency with respect to the type of 
target being presented. Indeed, we observed the temporal HR dynamics for the different expectancy 
states to vary across targets (significant Time × Expectancy × Target interaction; Table 2). Most 
important, there was an indication of interactive effects of Expectancy and Target in the early phase 
of the search task (Table 4). During that time, descriptively, spider targets were associated with 
stronger HR deceleration when they had been preceded by bird cues rather than by ambiguous or 
spider cues, whereas the reverse was true for bird targets (Figure 4). Although post hoc Tukey tests 
for this interaction did not reveal significant differences between the cues for either bird targets (ps 
> .16) or spider targets (ps > 27), planned comparisons contrasting spider and bird cues separately 
for both spider and bird targets achieved (marginal) significance (0-1 s, bird targets: F(1, 42) = 
3.36, p < .05; 0-1 s; spider targets: F(1, 42) = 3.62, p < .05; 1-2 s; bird targets: F(1, 42) = 4.23, p < 
.05; 1-2 s; spider targets: F(1, 42) = 2.46, p = .06; all based on one-tailed testing). Thus, in line with 
our predictions, disconfirmation of expectancies was associated with the most enhanced initial HR 
deceleration. In sum, whereas there was no clear-cut indication of cue impact on the processing of 
spider targets in our RT and pupil dilation data, HR data did show such an influence. 
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Other effects. The initial ANOVA revealed a significant Time × Expectancy interaction 
(Table 2). Expectancy effects were observed in the early phase after search array onset (0- to 1-s 
interval; Table 4), during which ambiguous cues were characterized by less HR deceleration than 
were spider or bird cues (Tukey tests, ambiguous vs. other cues: ps < .05; spider vs. bird cue: p > 
.92; Ms = -0.89, -0.93, and -0.56 bpm, SDErrors = 0.13, 0.14, and 0.11 bpm, for spider, bird, and 
ambiguous cues, respectively). From 3 to 4 s, bird cues were associated with marginally stronger 
acceleration than were ambiguous cues (Tukey test, p = .05; remaining pairwise comparisons: ps > 
.13; Ms = 0.43, 0.81, and 0.35 bpm, SDErrors = 0.25, 0.24, and 0.24 bpm, for spider, bird, and 
ambiguous cues, respectively; similar effects were visible as trends in the preceding and subsequent 
intervals; Table 4).  
Discussion 
The current study aimed at replicating and extending the findings from our previous study (Aue, 
Guex, et al., 2013) that suggested the existence of expectancy influences for the detection of bird 
targets, but not for the detection of spider targets, possibly due to the existence of an innate fear 
module (Davis & Lang, 2003; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Here, we 
additionally investigated whether and how attention bias and the influence of prior expectancies on 
attention to threatening versus nonthreatening targets are reflected in physiology.  
 
Attention Bias and Arousal 
We had predicted an attention bias for spiders, especially in the phobic group (cf. Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Öhman et al., 2001; Okon-Singer et al., 2013), to be reflected in shorter RTs, fewer errors, 
and more pronounced physiological responding (greater pupil dilation, greater initial HR 
deceleration) to spider targets than to bird targets. In line with our hypotheses, the participants’ RTs 
demonstrated a clear and robust attention bias in both groups, but there was no difference between 
phobics and controls. Facilitated identification of spider rather than bird targets in both groups was 
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also revealed in the error rates, with spider targets being characterized by less erroneous responses 
than bird targets. 
Moreover, these effects were supplemented with target-specific changes regarding our 
physiological measures. However, closer inspection of the specific types of effects observed speaks 
to these effects as arising from arousal (cf. Flykt, 2005; Flykt et al., 2012) rather than from orienting 
differences between the targets. For instance, our spider phobics’ HR was more elevated for spider 
targets than for bird targets at a comparably late moment (i.e., after the behavioral response had 
been given), whereas there was no difference between the targets in the early HR deceleration phase 
directly after the search array onset. Moreover, both groups of participants were characterized by a 
more enhanced (reflective of arousal; Aue, Hoeppli, & Piguet, 2012; Flykt, 2005; Flykt et al., 2012) 
rather than a more reduced (reflective of orienting; Stekelenburg & Van Boxtel, 2002) RR (see 
Supplementary Materials) for spider targets than for bird targets.  
Effects revealed in pupil diameter were of comparably short duration and opposite to our 
predictions; from 2 to 2.5 s following the search matrix onset, pupil diameter was temporarily more 
increased for bird than for spider targets. Even if pupil diameter were to be considered as a measure 
of arousal (e.g., Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008) rather than orienting of attention, this 
effect cannot be explained because both arousal and orienting of attention have been associated with 
increased pupil diameters in the literature (e.g., Bradley et al., 2008; Wang & Munoz, 2015). Yet, it 
must be kept in mind that the effect of Target during that time interval was qualified by the 
significant interaction of Expectancy and Target. Clearly, an increased diameter was observed only 
for those bird targets that had been preceded by incongruent (i.e., ambiguous and spider) cues. 
Consequently, we speculate that this effect, instead of reflecting increased arousal, indicates an 
elevated need for executive control (refer to Cue-Target Congruency section below for details). 
Overall, our data suggest a more rapid and more arousing processing of spider than of bird 
targets. Importantly, participants in the control group, who were characterized by low fear or even 
absence of fear of spiders, displayed virtually the same behavioral and physiological responses as 
spider phobic individuals (except in HR, which showed interactive effects of Group and Target). 
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Our findings are thus supportive of the idea of an innate fear module (Davis & Lang, 2003; LeDoux 
& Phelps, 2000; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) that intensifies bottom-up attentional capture by 
phylogenetic threat (cf. Yiend, 2010; but see Lipp, 2006, for criticisms related to this issue). The 
observation of similar behavioral results in infants and children who have not yet acquired threat-
related fears (LoBue & Rakison, 2013) speaks to the importance of congenital factors for these 
effects. Interestingly, attention biases have even been observed with abstract shapes that were 
associated with phylogenetic threat versus harmless animals (Batty, Cave, & Pauli, 2005). Such a 
finding precludes the possibility of pop-out effects of certain classes of stimuli being responsible for 
the attention bias phenomenon in visual search.  
 
Cue-Target Congruency 
From our earlier research (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013), we had hypothesized that there would be 
asymmetric influences of the expectancy cues on vigilance to spider versus bird targets as revealed 
by our behavioral data, with only vigilance to bird targets being affected by the cues. Supportive 
evidence for this claim comes first from our phobic participants’ error rates. These participants 
displayed greater error rates for incorrectly rather than correctly and ambiguously cued bird targets. 
By contrast, an influence of the expectancy cues on error rates was absent for spider targets.  
Further in line with our predictions and replicating the findings from our earlier study (Aue, 
Guex, et al., 2013), expectancy effects revealed in the RT data were restricted to bird targets in the 
control group. This time, however, spider phobics revealed expectancy modulation of RTs for bird 
and spider targets. Somewhat counterintuitively at first glance, these participants displayed slowed 
rather than accelerated RTs when spider targets had been preceded by spider rather than by bird 
cues. (While our hypothesis predicted no RT difference for spider targets following spider cues 
compared with bird cues, the opposite pattern of results to that observed would have been more 
plausible [i.e., valid expectancy cues speeding up rather than slowing down RTs].) However, one 
needs to take into consideration that these participants were characterized by a slowed response for 
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the identification of any stimulus that was preceded by a spider cue (main effect of Expectancy, 
absence of Expectancy × Target interaction). Hence, this effect may be the result of (a) phobic 
participants exhibiting difficulty in disengaging attention from the threatening spider cues (for 
evidence regarding impaired disengagement from threat, see Koster, Crombez, Verschure, & De 
Houwer, 2004; Koster, Crombez, Verschure, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), or (b) these 
participants displaying some degree of visual avoidance (e.g., Aue, Hoeppli, et al., 2013) following 
the presentation of the spider cues. In both cases, focusing attention on the subsequently appearing 
visual search array would have been compromised.  
According to Peschard and Philippot (2015), the attentional focus is determined (among 
other factors) by both task goals and stimulus salience, which closely relates to the notion of top-
down versus bottom-up influences on attention deployment (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In the 
present experiment, the participants’ goal was to detect as quickly and rapidly as possible the target, 
irrespective of the target’s nature. Evidently, our participants pursued these task goals and were able 
to enhance task performance by paying attention to the expectancy cues. However, the facilitative 
effect provided by the cues was restricted to bird targets. Notably, Peschard and Philippot (2015) 
acknowledge that in some cases it might be necessary to quickly switch attention from task goals to 
salient sensory input, and they explicitly mention phylogenetic threat as constituting such salient 
input. The current experiment yields evidence for their postulate by demonstrating that stimulus 
salience can indeed, at least temporarily, overwrite task goals. Moreover, because the response of 
both spider phobics and control participants (who had been selected on the basis of particularly low 
spider fear) was surprisingly similar, it can be argued that stimulus saliency here has not been 
determined by actual or conscious fear, but by its evolutionary significance (Öhman et al., 2001; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971; see Attention Bias and Arousal section above for details). 
Common sense would have led one to predict that at least the phobic group would benefit 
from the presentation of the cues for their identification of spider targets because they should be in 
an alarm state whenever spider cues are presented. That this effect was not observed here and in our 
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earlier study (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013) could be explained by the fact that human beings are 
endowed with specific threat detection mechanisms (Davis & Lang, 2003; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001) that act (somewhat) independently of prior expectancies. Such 
independency could ultimately pay off. After all, relying erroneously on presumable safety signals 
can have fatal consequences in life-threatening situations. However, to date, our findings do not rule 
out the possibility that more significant self-relevant predictors than the cues in the current study do 
influence RTs. 
Other researchers have shown, in contrast to the behavioral findings in the current study, 
that visual search may benefit from prior knowledge about the spatial location of subsequently 
appearing targets (e.g., Mohanty, Egner, Monti, & Mesulam, 2009; Mohanty, Gitelman, Small, & 
Mesulam, 2008). What is more, anticipation of the type of deviating emotional facial expression 
(including threatening displays) in a search array has also been reported to accelerate RTs (Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007; M. A. Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). However, these studies 
differ from our own in important ways. Apart from the fact that these studies included other 
stimulus material (i.e., facial expressions), the participants were not preinformed about the 
likelihood of any stimulus being the (deviant) target, whereas we varied these likelihoods on a trial-
to-trial basis via the presentation of the expectancy cues. Further differences consist in these authors 
using (a) only a single target (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007), or (b) the same facial expressions as 
distractors in some trials and targets in other experimental trials (thus including only two stimulus 
categories; e.g., neutral among happy expressions and happy among neutral expressions; M. A. 
Williams et al., 2005). Any of these factors may have rendered these tasks less difficult than our 
own.  
One study (Mohanty et al., 2009), however, used a cueing procedure that was highly similar 
to ours for the detection of tilted targets (i.e., faces) in a search array. In contrast to our own results, 
in this study, RTs to angry facial expressions (indexing phylogenetic threat) were demonstrated to 
be influenced by prior knowledge about the location and type of the to-be-detected stimulus. Such 
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anticipation-based visual search has been suggested to rely on activity in a fronto-parietal attention 
network (comprising the frontal eye fields, the posterior parietal cortex, and the posterior cingulate 
cortex; Mohanty & Sussman, 2013) that exerts causal influences on visual cortex activity. Hence, 
Mohanty et al.’s (2009) results are in line with the so-called predictive coding theory that states that 
human beings establish mental templates about future happenings to which incoming sensory 
information is compared (e.g., Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011). Of 
note, the search display in the Mohanty et al. (2009) study consisted of only four simultaneously 
presented facial expressions, and valid spatial cueing required the participants to make a decision 
between only two elements in the search array. Again, this may have rendered the task easier than 
our own. 
Along these lines, the importance of the number of distractors in visual search arrays has 
been demonstrated by several works. Öhman et al. (2001) reported the detection of snake targets to 
be uninfluenced by the number of distractors (three vs. eight), whereas this was not the case for the 
detection of fear-irrelevant (e.g., flowers) targets. The authors interpreted these results as evidence 
for preattentive, parallel processing of phylogenetic threat, whereas search for fear-irrelevant targets 
relied on postattentive, serial processing. Comparably, Lipp, Derakshan, Waters, and Logies (2004, 
Experiment 1) reported their participants to display an increase in search advantage for 
phylogenetic threat over harmless stimuli when the number of elements in the search matrix was 
increased from four to nine. Moreover, this advantage for threat over nonthreat was revealed for 
different types of background distractors (i.e., for phylogenetic threat distractors as well as for 
harmless distractors). Something that should be taken into account, however, is that in Lipp et al.’s 
(2004, Experiment 1) study, the identification of both threat and fear-irrelevant targets in the matrix 
containing nine (rather than four) elements was slowed. Thus, when perceptual resources are 
depleted, even the processing of phylogenetic threat stimuli may, at least partly, rely on serial 
information processing. 
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In our own experiment, we used a search array with nine elements, which corresponds to the 
high perceptual load conditions in these earlier studies. According to the ideas raised by Öhman et 
al. (2001), RT differences between threat and nonthreat should therefore be magnified. Our data 
actually conform to these ideas. Specifically, parallel processing of the threatening spider targets 
may have prevented the expectancy cues from making an impact. Nonthreat, instead, which is 
supposed to be processed serially, should then indeed be more prone to top-down influences such as 
prior expectancies. Consequently, from the RTs, one might be tempted to conclude that, instead of 
gating visual search for phylogenetic threat, the expectancy cues’ influence is restricted to later 
processing stages. Yet, such an interpretation is challenged by our HR data that yield evidence for 
an early consideration of cue-target congruency even in the case of phylogenetic threat (discussed in 
detail below). Future research should vary matrix sizes in order to further investigate this issue. 
Apart from behavioral preparation, we examined the degree to which our anticipated effects 
in behavior would be complemented by physiological effects. Specifically, we had hypothesized 
that expectancy confirmation and violation, even if not influencing behavioral responding, would be 
registered by the organism. Given the greater need of orienting in case of incongruent rather than 
congruent cueing, we had predicted opposite influences of the expectancy cues on the two targets. 
Inconsistent with these predictions, expectancy influences on pupil diameter were restricted to bird 
targets (smallest diameter for bird cues), but, again, no such influence was found for the 
experimental trials with spider targets. Hence, these pupil data reveal effects that closely resemble 
the behavioral effects reported above. 
Of importance, though, is that the asymmetric effects in behavior and pupil diameter were 
not mirrored in our HR data: These data did show cue-target congruency for both types of targets 
and both groups of participants. Basically, in accordance with our hypotheses, HR indeed revealed a 
greater orienting response (i.e., initial HR deceleration; cf. Bradley & Lang, 2007; Stekelenburg & 
Van Boxtel, 2002) in the case that expectancies had been disconfirmed rather than confirmed. It 
remains to be clarified why the cue-target congruency effect as revealed in our participants’ HR 
Expectancy Influences on Attention to Threat   30 
 
data is not also reflected in their behavioral responses, pupil diameter, and RR. One possible 
interpretation would be that HR effects in the current study, contrary to our initial considerations, 
were actually unrelated to reorienting of attention.  
However, an alternative interpretation of the data, to us, appears to be more appropriate: 
First, one needs to take into account that RT constitutes a single-moment snapshot measure, 
whereas our HR data were assessed continuously and therefore may have revealed temporal effects 
that, when integrated, can be hidden in RT data. Second, pupil diameter has been related not to only 
a single network, but to at least three different attention networks, with the activations of these 
networks being temporally distinct (Geva, Zivan, Warsha, & Olchik, 2013). According to these 
conceptions, orienting effects in pupil diameter precede effects associated with executive control. 
Comparison of our own pupil diameter data with the timelines provided by Geva et al. (2013) 
suggests that the expectancy variations during the detection of bird targets constitute an index of 
differential degrees of executive control rather than orienting. A fear module may render executive 
control for the processing of phylogenetic threat largely dispensable, which could explain the 
absence of expectancy influences on pupil diameter for spider targets.  
The interpretation of HR effects representing orienting characteristics and pupil dilation 
representing executive control characteristics is further supported by the fact that the critical 
interaction between Expectancy and Target in the present study arises earlier in HR than in pupil 
diameter. Finally, RR, as a long latency signal, may have lacked the level of sensitivity that is 
necessary to capture fine-grained temporal variations in attention. 
In sum, our behavioral and pupil diameter data are in line with the postulate of specific 
attentional systems for phylogenetically salient stimuli such as threatening animals. These systems 
may be intimately linked with amygdala activity and ensure automatic information processing 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010) that overwrites current task goals. In contrast to the permeability of 
detection systems for neutral stimuli, the penetration of these threat-specific systems by prior 
(experimentally induced) expectancies may be more restricted. While our HR data suggest that 
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early attention to threat might still be somewhat influenced by prior expectancies, this influence 
may often be too feeble to be translated into behavior; it is possible that expectancy influences 
during the detection of spider targets are only weak and transient, and then are quickly overwritten 
by the strong effects evoked by the spider targets. It is still imaginable that later, more strategic, 
attention biases such as visual avoidance (which we did not measure in the current experiment) are 
linked with prior expectancies. A study by Rohner (2004), for instance, suggests that prior 
information about the location of angry faces is associated with more efficient visual avoidance in 
anxious participants. Our own observation that visual avoidance (but not early visual attention) is 
associated with encounter expectancies for spiders (Aue, Hoeppli, et al., 2013) is consistent with 
such a conception. Further in agreement with these reflections, Everaert et al. (2012) described the 
interplay between congruent biases in attention and memory in depression as being limited to later 
information processing stages. 
Limitations 
Some limitations of our study need to be mentioned. We informed our participants that, in 90% of 
the cases, spider and bird expectancy cues would correctly prime the target in the search array. Yet, 
to ascertain a sufficiently high number of valid samples in incongruent priming trials, we had 
correct priming in only 70% of these cases. Providing our participants with a reference point of 
90% instead of 70% aimed at increasing expectancy influences on visual search. An unwanted side 
effect, however, may have been that our participants felt wrongly informed, which may have 
resulted in lowered trust in the expectancy cues. Experienced discrepancy between explicit (i.e., 
instructed) and implicit expectancies may then have led participants to no longer follow the cues 
rather than augmenting their impact.  
Yet, three important considerations speak against a complete mistrust with respect to the 
expectancy cues. First, there is evidence in the literature that instructions about proportions can be 
sufficient to produce corresponding behavioral effects (Entel, Tzelgov, & Bereby-Meyer, 2014, 
Experiment 1), even if the information that is given does not match the real proportions. Second, 
Expectancy Influences on Attention to Threat   32 
 
even with the 70% chance, our participants experienced spider and bird cues to correctly prime the 
targets in the majority of cases. Consequently, implicitly, they should have learned that these cues 
had at least some predictive power with respect to the target; when seeing the spider 90% 
expectancy cue, they should still have felt that there was a higher likelihood of a spider rather a bird 
being the target. Third, that our expectancy cues may have been distrusted overall is refuted by our 
data regarding bird targets. The fact that we found robust expectancy effects for the bird targets 
across various behavioral and physiological parameters demonstrates that our participants 
recognized the cues and trusted them at least to some degree. Because similar expectancy cues had 
been used for bird and spider targets, differences between the targets cannot be explained by our 
participants not having considered the expectancy cues. These considerations notwithstanding, we 
cannot rule out that an increase in predictability (i.e., salience) of the expectancy cues may result in 
more robust expectancy influences on the identification of spider targets.  
In addition, we cannot dismiss the possibility that we might have found more convincing 
evidence for expectancy influences on attention to spider targets with a larger sample size. 
However, inspection of the corresponding effect sizes revealed these to be negligible, and adding 
more participants should not have much of an impact. Hence, the vast absence of significant results 
regarding the importance of the expectancy cues for the processing of spider targets does not seem 
to be a question of statistical power. Moreover, results in the current study largely replicate our 
earlier behavioral findings (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013), which further emphasizes the robustness of the 
effects. In conclusion, we do not renounce the possibility that expectancies influence the detection 
of spider targets, but the detection mechanism for phylogenetic threat stimuli clearly does not 
appear to be as permeable to expectancies as attentive systems that are responsible for the detection 
of harmless stimuli.  
Summary and Future Directions 
Behavioral and physiological data in the current study revealed the existence of an attention bias in 
phobics and controls. More important, we found no simple facilitative effect of the expectancy cues 
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on the identification of spider targets. That our expectancy manipulation was successful, though, 
was revealed in the RTs for bird targets (and also in the phobic participants’ error rates), which 
clearly showed facilitation and complication effects by the verbal expectancy cues that had been 
presented earlier. We have pointed to the possibility of the existence of attentional systems specific 
to the detection of phylogenetically salient stimuli such as threatening animals. In contrast to 
detection systems for neutral stimuli, the penetration of these threat-specific systems by prior 
(experimentally induced) expectancies may be more restricted. In fact, our data revealed a greater 
and more straightforward influence of expectancies on attention to the harmless birds.  
It is possible that more time-sensitive measures (rather than single-moment snapshot data 
such as RTs) reveal greater influences of expectancies on attention to threatening stimuli. Our HR, 
but not our pupil diameter, findings are consistent with such an idea. Adding 
electroencephalographic recordings to the list of dependent variables may further increase our 
knowledge on the temporal dynamics of expectancy influences on attention allocation. Future 
research should also test whether the effects observed in our RTs originate in attentional or motor 
processes. Despite the fact that the visual search task is considered to measure attentional capture, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that part of the differences in RTs observed here result from 
facilitated or complicated motor responses. The inclusion of electromyographic measures and 
neuroimaging in subsequent studies may help to further elucidate this point.   
While there is some evidence regarding the influence of expectancy on attentional processes 
in the current research, the reverse link deserves consideration as well. It is imaginable that different 
expectations originate in differences in attention (e.g., vigilance vs. avoidance). Moreover, although 
in our previous research (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013) we had initially hypothesized that memory 
processes would mediate the effects of expectancies on attention deployment (see Olivers, Peters, 
Houtkamp, & Roelfsema, 2011; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008, for discussions of 
and conditions for memory-based attention), we did not explicitly measure working memory 
content in this previous study or in the current study. The simultaneous investigation of working 
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memory content could therefore help to further elucidate the effects obtained here. Generally, the 
inclusion of other processing biases (e.g., in memory and interpretation) in the study of expectancy-
attention associations is indispensable (see Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015, for details). Recent research 
is supportive of the idea that memory and interpretation peculiarities may play fundamental roles in 
expectancy formation and attention deployment, in health as well as in psychopathology (e.g., 
Blaut, Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013; Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; 
LeMoult & Joormann, 2012).   
Finally, future research needs to test whether the effects observed for spider targets in the 
current study are characteristic of phylogenetically salient stimuli or whether they translate to other, 
more recent threat signals (e.g., guns and knives), to all kinds of negative (including, for instance, 
disgusting or saddening) stimuli, or even to all kinds of emotional (including positive) stimuli. In 
fact, contemporary publications discuss the possibility that positive attention biases might be 
closely associated with positive expectancy biases (e.g., overoptimism or wishful thinking; Aue, 
Nusbaum, & Cacioppo, 2012; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). Better knowledge of the interplay 
between different types of positive cognitive biases, and their similarities and differences with 
respect to threat-related and other negative cognitive biases, may therefore be most stimulating.   
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Footnotes 
1More concretely, we had hypothesized that high expectancies regarding the appearance of 
threatening (i.e., spiders) versus nonthreatening (i.e., birds) animals would effectuate a top-down 
influence on visual search for threat by activating adequate working memory content (for evidence 
of memory-guided attention, see Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; 
Wolfe, 2010; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003). Memory could thus act as a mediator in the 
expectancy-attention association. More proximal influences between processes related to 
expectancies and attention are also imaginable. For instance, expectancies might exert a top-down 
influence on the engagement of attention simply because highly fearful individuals who expect to 
encounter spiders with a comparably high likelihood are more strongly motivated to overcome 
obstacles; this increased motivation might then be expressed in stronger vigilance. 
2Along these lines, other research indeed suggests that confirmation versus disconfirmation 
of expectancies may impact physiological responding (e.g., Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & 
Jost, 2007; Sebastiani, D’Alessandro, & Gemignani, 2014).  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example of experimental trial. Spider 90%, bird 90%, and spider-bird 50% refer to the 
expectancy of the target to be a spider or a bird. Jitters have been introduced to prevent habituation.  
Figure 2. Reaction times as a function of Group, Expectancy, and Target. Spider cue, bird cue, and 
ambiguous cue refer to the spider 90%, bird 90%, and spider-bird [bird-spider] 50% cues, 
respectively. Error bars depict standard errors. 
Figure 3. Pupil diameter change as a function of Time, Expectancy, and Target. Spider cue, bird 
cue, and ambiguous cue refer to the spider 90%, bird 90%, and spider-bird [bird-spider] 50% cues, 
respectively. Error bars depict standard errors. 
Figure 4. Heart rate change as a function of Time, Expectancy, and Target. Spider cue, bird cue, 
and ambiguous cue refer to the spider 90%, bird 90%, and spider-bird [bird-spider] 50% cues, 
respectively. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Table 1  
Behavior: Summary of invalid responses per group and trial type 
    Phobics   Controls  
Trial type   Mean Median Mean rank 
(Friedman)a 
Mean Median Mean rank 
(Friedman) a 
 
Number of errors (rate of errors) 
Spider target 
        
- Spider cue (n = 68)   3.6 (5.3%) 3.0 (4.4%) 2.31 5.7 (8.5%) 4.0 (5.9%) 2.23 
- Bird cue (n = 24)   1.0 (4.2%) 0.0 (0.0%) 1.71 2.1 (8.7%) 1.5 (6.3%) 2.06 
- Ambiguous cue (n = 24)   1.2 (5.2%) 1.0 (4.2%) 1.98 1.6 (6.8%) 1.0 (4.2%) 1.71 
Bird target         
- Spider cue (n = 24)   3.8 (15.7%) 3.0 (12.5%) 1.50 3.8 (16.0%) 2.0 (8.3%) 2.04 
- Bird cue (n = 68)   5.1 (7.6%) 3.0 (4.4%) 1.86 7.0 (10.4%) 4.0 (5.9%) 1.75 
- Ambiguous cue (n = 24)   1.7 (6.9%) 1.0 (4.2%) 1.50 3.0 (12.7%) 2.0 (8.3%) 2.21 
         
All conditions (n = 232)   16.4 (7.1%) 12 (5.2%)  23.4 (10.1%) 14 (6.0%)  
 
Number (rate) of outliers in RT  
        
All conditions (n = 232; 
      trials without targets being excluded) 
  0.7 (0.3%);  
SD = 0.84   
  0.9 (0.4%); 
SD = 0.88 
  
 
Note. Trials without targets have been altogether excluded. Because of the uneven numbers of trials in the different categories (as specified within the parentheses on the left 
side), a higher number of errors performed in one category compared with another may still correspond to a lower error rate. Values within parentheses, but not those outside, 
adjust for this uneven sampling and therefore better correspond to the statistical analyses performed. RT = reaction time. 
aRelated to the Friedman tests conducted to test for an influence of expectancy cues on target detection (as revealed in the participants’ error rates).  
Table 2 
Summary of conducted ANOVAs 
  Measures 
Effects Reaction times Pupil diameter change 
df F p η2p df F p η2p 
Group (1) 1, 43 0.06 .813 .00 1, 40 5.50 .024 .12 
Time (2) 5, 200 90.82 1.5478E-49 .69 
Group × Time 5, 200 4.39 .001 .10 
Expectancy (3) 2, 86 23.25 .8.4955E-9 .35 2, 80 3.87 .025 .09 
Group × Expectancy 2, 86 1.64 .200 .04 2, 80 0.68 .508 .02 
Target (4) 1, 43 126.18 2.256E-14 .75 1, 40 0.89 .352 .02 
Group × Target 1, 43 1.15 .289 .03 1, 40 1.00 .323 .02 
Time × Expectancy 10, 400 1.11 .353 .03 
Group × Time × Expectancy 10, 400 0.93 .504 .02 
Time × Target 5, 200 4.25 .001 .10 
Group × Time × Target 5, 200 1.27 .279 .03 
Expectancy × Target 2, 86 10.40 .0001 .20 2, 80 5.44 .006 .12 
Group × Expectancy × Target 2, 86 3.13 .049 .07 2, 80 0.01 .987 .00 
Time × Expectancy × Target 10, 400 5.26 2.7967E-7 .12 
1 × 2 × 3 × 4            10, 400 1.44 .158 .03 
 
Table 2 continued 
                                                                                                                            
    Heart rate change   
       df F p η2p      
Group (1)       1, 42 0.29 .591 .01      
Time (2)       4, 168 46.31 3.4817E-26 .52      
Group × Time       4, 168 0.18 .948 .00      
Expectancy (3)       2, 84 0.82 .445 .02      
Group × Expectancy       2, 84 0.55 .577 .01      
Target (4)       1, 42 6.00 .019 .13      
Group × Target       1, 42 6.10 .018 .13      
Time × Expectancy       8, 336 6.63 4.7332E-8 .14      
Group × Time × Expectancy       8, 336 0.41 .912 .01      
Time × Target       4, 168 10.53 1.2265E-7 .20      
Group × Time × Target       4, 168 2.12 .081 .05      
Expectancy × Target       2, 84 1.67 .194 .04      
Group × Expectancy × Target       2, 84 0.07 .934 .00      
Time × Expectancy × Target       8, 336 2.09 .036 .05      
1 × 2 × 3 × 4       8, 336 0.66 .727 .02      
          Note. η2p = partial η2 .  ANOVAs = analyses of variance. Bold font: p < .05. 
Table 3  
Pupil diameter: summary of the 2 (Group) × 3 (Expectancy) × 2 (Target) ANOVA results for each time interval 
  
 Time interval 
  
      0-0.5 s    0.5-1 s    1-1.5 s      
Effects  df      F p η2p  F p η2p  F p η2p     
Group (1) 1, 40      0.07 .791 .00  4.43 .042 .10  3.48 .070 .08     
Expectancy (2) 2, 80      4.93 .010 .11  2.05 .136 .05  4.32 .017 .10     
Group × Expectancy 2, 80      0.82 .442 .02  0.66 .520 .02  1.58 .212 .04     
Target (3) 1, 40      1.08 .306 .03  0.04 .841 .00  0.61 .441 .01     
Group × Target 1, 40      0.30 .587 .01  0.07 .796 .00  0.05 .829 .00     
Expectancy × Target  2, 80      0.44 .646 .01  0.00 .996 .00  5.91 .004 .13     
1 × 2 ×3 2, 80      0.75 .475 .02  1.88 .159 .04  0.20 .816 .01     
 
  
      1.5-2 s    2-2.5 s    2.5-3 s      
Effects  df      F p η2p  F p η2p  F p η2p     
Group (1) 1, 40      4.28 .045 .10  5.72 .022 .13  7.51 .009 .16     
Expectancy (2) 2, 80      1.53 .222 .04  1.66 .196 .04  3.91 .024 .09     
Group × Expectancy 2, 80      1.34 .268 .03  0.91 .406 .02  0.01 .990 .00     
Target (3) 1, 40      0.45 .506 .01  4.14 .049 .09  2.72 .107 .06     
Group × Target 1, 40      0.47 .496 .01  1.76 .192 .04  1.67 .204 .04     
Expectancy × Target  2, 80      6.85 .002 .15  7.52 .001 .16  4.50 .014 .10     
1 × 2 ×3 2, 80 0.34 .714 .01 0.63 .536 .02 0.43 .654 .01 
Note. η2p = partial η2 . Bold font: p < .05. 
